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ΠΕΡΙΛΗΨΗ 
Στην διπλωματική αυτή εργασία παρουσιάζονται τα βασικά οικονομικά και οι 
τεχνολογίες που είναι απαραίτητες για τη δημιουργία μιας ανταγωνιστικής αγοράς 
ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας (pool-based, short-term, competitive electricity market 
coordinated by a system operator). 
Ο στόχος της ανταγωνιστικής αγοράς ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας είναι η ισορροπία 
μεταξύ προσφοράς και ζήτησης ενέργειας, ειδικά σε περιόδους αιχμής, σε ένα 
κόσμο που οι απαιτήσεις για ηλεκτρική ενέργεια αυξάνονται συνεχώς. Η συνεχής 
παροχή ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας είναι ζωτικής σημασίας για τη ζωή των ανθρώπων. Οι 
διακοπές στην ηλεκτρική ενέργεια λόγω της μη δυνατότητας του συστήματος να 
παρέχει ενέργεια σε περιόδους αιχμής, εμπεριέχει τεράστιο κόστος τόσο 
οικονομικό όσο και κοινωνικό. 
Στην ανταγωνιστική αγορά ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας η συμμετοχή του καταναλωτή στον 
καθορισμό της τιμής της ενέργειας είναι αυτό που την κάνει να ξεχωρίζει. Ο 
καταναλωτής δεν είναι ποια αυτός που δέχεται την τιμή της ενέργειας αλλά αυτός 
που την καθορίζει. Ο καταναλωτής επιλέγει σε τι τιμή είναι πρόθυμος να αγοράσει 
ηλεκτρική ενέργεια και οι παραγωγοί ανταγωνίζονται μεταξύ τους για να 
εξυπηρετήσουν τη ζήτηση. Η όλη διαδικασία συντονίζεται από ένα διαχειριστή 
συστήματος (system operator). Ο διαχειριστής συστήματος δέχεται προσφορές 
(market biddings) από τους παραγωγούς και τους καταναλωτές και σε στιγμιαίο 
χρόνο υπολογίζει την τιμή ισορροπίας της αγοράς, έτσι ώστε η προσφορά να 
ισούται με τη ζήτηση. Η διαδικασία των προσφορών λαμβάνει χώρα στις αγορές 
άμεσης παράδοσης (spot markets) και για ένα μικρό χρονικό διάστημα, ας πούμε 
κάθε 15 λεπτά, καθορίζεται η νέα τιμή ισορροπίας της ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας.  
Επίσης στην ανταγωνιστική αγορά ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας εισάγεται η έννοια των 
συμβολαίων μακράς διάρκειας ώστε να αντισταθμίζεται ο κίνδυνος της συνεχούς 
αλλαγής των τιμών της ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας αλλά και του κόστους συμφόρησης 
μεταφοράς της ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας πάνω στο δίκτυο. Το δίκτυο ηλεκτρικής 
ενέργειας είναι εξαιρετικά πολύπλοκο και έχει πολλούς περιορισμός στην 
μεταφορά ενέργειας, όπως θερμικούς περιορισμούς (thermal constrains), 
περιορισμούς τάσης (voltage constrains) και άλλα. 
Φυσικά τίποτα από όλα αυτά δεν θα ήταν εφικτό αν δεν υπήρχε η σύγχρονη 
τεχνολογία να το υποστηρίξει. Τα έξυπνα δίκτυα χρησιμοποιούν τελευταίας γενιάς 
τεχνολογίες όπως παρακολούθηση και έλεγχος σε πραγματικό χρόνο μεγάλων 
περιοχών, προηγμένες υποδομές μέτρησης, συστήματα ανταπόκρισης στη ζήτηση, 
εφαρμογές ενίσχυσης του συστήματος μεταφοράς και άλλα. 
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Τα έξυπνα δίκτυα επόμενης γενιάς οδηγούνται από σύγχρονες προκλήσεις όπως 
συνεχής αύξηση ζήτησης ενέργειας, ανανεώσιμες πηγές, απώλειες ενέργειας του 
συστήματος μεταφοράς, ηλεκτρικά οχήματα αλλά και αξιοπιστία του δικτύου. 
Τα έξυπνα δίκτυα μπορούν να εισάγουν αποκεντρωμένες πηγές ανανεώσιμης 
ενέργειας. Επίσης είναι αυτά που μπορούν να συντονίσουν παραγωγούς, 
καταναλωτές αλλά και άλλους συμμετέχοντες στην αγορά, όπως για παράδειγμα ότι 
αφορά στην μετάδοση της ενέργειας στο δίκτυο και την κατανομή στους τελικούς 
καταναλωτές. Και τέλος τα έξυπνα δίκτυα μπορούν να διαδραματίσουν έναν ακόμα 
πολύ σημαντικό ρόλο, αυτόν της αντιμετώπισης των σύγχρονων περιβαλλοντικών 
προκλήσεων.  
Τελικά η μεγαλύτερη διασύνδεση μέσω των δικτύων, οι ανανεώσιμες πηγές 
ενέργειας αλλά και η ζήτηση που καθοδηγείται από την τιμή της ηλεκτρικής 
ενέργειας είναι αυτά που μετατρέπουν τα συμβατικά δίκτυα ηλεκτρικής ενέργειας 
σε έξυπνα δίκτυα επόμενης γενιάς. 
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Abstract 
 
In this thesis, it is going to be presented the economics need it for the restructuring 
of the competitive electricity market. A pool-based, short-term, competitive 
electricity market coordinated by a system operator, radically changes the traditional 
way markets work. Consumers play a significant role in the electricity market 
restructuring because they undertake the role of price-makers. A system operator 
takes bids from generators and consumers of energy in order to balance supply and 
demand. The notions of short-run competitive electricity market, transmission 
congestion costs over the grid, long-run market contracts and scheduling and 
balancing methods are going to be introduced. 
 
However, the restructuring of the electricity market would not be possible without 
the technology development and the smart grids. Many state of the art technologies 
like monitoring and control, demand response systems, transmission enhancement 
applications, advanced metering infrastructure and of course information and 
communication technologies, provide the grid with all these tools needed it, in order 
to meet the growing challenges of today and they are going to be analyzed in this 
thesis. 
Greater interconnectedness, renewable energy and price-directed demand drive the 
evolution of the conventional power grids towards intelligent power networks. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“When Smart Grid implementation becomes reality, everyone wins – and what were 
once our risks become our strengths” (U.S. Department of Energy). 
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1. Introduction 
 
Electricity systems worldwide face a number of challenges, including ageing 
infrastructure, continued growth in demand, shifting load patterns, the need to 
integrate new sources of supply and the variability of some sources of renewable-
based supply. Line loss, greenhouse gas emissions, fuel costs, regulatory concerns, 
government mandates and myriad other issues necessitate another look at how 
electricity is generated and delivered. Offering 99% reliability is no longer sufficient 
to serve the needs of a highly technological society. Combined with other emerging 
trends, the increasing global population and the growing development of 
renewables will place substantial stress on a grid that was designed many years ago. 
 
Smart-grid technologies offer a cost-effective means of helping to meet these 
challenges and contribute to the establishment of an energy system that is more 
energy efficient, more secure and more sustainable. 
 
Still, energy and where to find it, for an increasingly energy-hungry world, is going to 
be an issue moving forward, and so will be the management of the energy we have. 
On October 31, 2011, the estimated world population reached 7 billion people, and 
it is growing at a rate of about 215,120 people per day. Large numbers of people - 
particularly in China and India - are moving into the middle class and can now afford 
luxuries, such as refrigerators and air conditioners. More factories are needed to 
manufacture these products, more businesses are needed to sell them and more 
service providers are needed to cater to them. As a consequence, new and larger 
demands are being made for electric power, and new electric infrastructure is being 
built. 
 
The fundamental issue of the smart grid is a seamless system that provides 
electricity supply and demand all the time. In the competitive electricity market large 
numbers of producers compete with each other to satisfy the wants and needs of a 
large number of consumers. Consumers help balance supply and demand, and 
ensure reliability by modifying the way they use and purchase electricity. Customers 
have demands that are sensitive to price, and higher prices produce lower demands. 
In this way, we reach a point where the quantity demanded by consumers at current 
price will equal the quantity supplied by producers. 
 
Greater interconnectedness, renewables and price-directed demand drive the 
evolution of the conventional power grids towards intelligent power networks. 
 
In this thesis, it is going to be presented in chapter two how the way of living in our 
contemporary world challenges the traditional grid and how these challenges are the 
drivers for developing a smart power grid. In addition to that, smart grid 
technologies are going to be presented and analyzed. In chapter three, basic 
economics of supply, demand and market equilibrium will be presented and also 
types of markets are going to be analyzed. In chapter four, it is going to be presented 
all the energy economics needed for restructuring the electricity market, in order to 
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build a wholesale competitive electricity market coordinated by a system operator. 
The basic idea of the wholesale competitive electricity market is that of balancing 
supply and demand of electricity in an optimal way that benefits both producers and 
consumers of energy. In the competitive electricity market, as it is going to be 
analyzed in chapter four, consumers are “price makers” and generators of energy 
are “price takers”, which is something that changes radically the “rules” of the 
electricity markets. 
 
The evolution of the information and communication technologies and the smart 
grids gives as the capability for the total restructuring of the electricity market, in 
order to meet the continuous growth of electricity demand. 
 
 
2. Smart Electricity Networks 
 
 
The availability of reliable supplies of electricity has become increasingly essential for 
daily living for most people in both developed and developing countries. It lights 
homes and workplaces, powers computers and enables industrial activity. 
 
Most electrical power, regardless of how it is produced or used, is transferred from 
generation plant to consumers through electricity networks, known as electricity 
grids or the grid. 
 
To meet the demand for reliable supply, the grid must operate 24 hours a day, 365 
days a year, meeting and balancing ever-changing levels of demand and supply. And 
it must do so in a cost-effective way, often using an ageing infrastructure. The 
complexity of this operation will be further complicated by steps to increase the use 
of electricity for both public and private transportation, the bringing on stream of 
greater amounts of renewable energy and other distributed generation, and 
increasing demand for electricity in general (IEA, 2010). 
 
In the developing world and emerging economies, electricity demand is increasing at 
significant rates in response to economic and social development. Development and 
growth vary between regions and there continues to be a need to address energy 
poverty in many areas. Existing electricity systems are insufficient for today’s needs 
in many parts of the world. Change and investment will be required to enable 
further development and growth. 
 
The changes projected in electricity generation and demand, both in the IEA Baseline 
scenario and the IEA BLUE Map scenario in 2050 (see APPENDIX for scenario 
descriptions), will require an enormous investment in the electricity grid. Investment 
in so-called smart grid technologies will be fundamental to enabling these changes. 
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2.1 History of the Grid 
 
 
The electricity grid has traditionally been developed, designed and implemented in 
such a way that electricity flows one-way from large generators to widely distributed 
loads. This highly structured and centralized approach has drawbacks at three 
distinct levels in the system (IEA, 2010): 
 
 “Distribution system operators have little or no detailed information on the 
demand from different sectors or nodes on the grid. So, for example, when a 
residential power outage occurs, the supply utility typically only becomes 
aware of it when consumers phone to ask what is happening. 
 
 Transmission system operators have more intelligence about changes in 
demand and supply on the network. But this is still insufficient at times to 
allow utilities to anticipate or receive prior warning of developing problems. 
This limits the extent to which generators can proactively dispatch grid 
support or isolate minor problems so as to prevent the sort of large-scale 
outages that have been seen in the United States, Canada and Italy in recent 
years. 
 
 Many end users are billed according to the amount of electricity they have 
used over an extended time period. They, therefore, have no access to 
detailed information on how or when they are using electricity. So they have 
no means of readily identifying ways of reducing or shifting their electricity 
use to minimize their demand and costs” (IEA, 2010). 
 
These are all challenging weaknesses in the traditional electricity grid. They need to 
be met by the implementation of new technology and methodologies for the design, 
maintenance and operation of electricity distribution systems. These need to be 
better adapted to modern circumstances, such as the emerging growth in consumers 
wanting to generate their own electricity with the option to sell any excess 
generation back to the grid. 
 
Developing countries may have the opportunity to make early technological leaps to 
the implementation of smart grids, without going through the extensive 
development of traditional grids. This will enable them to benefit from these new 
technologies early in the implementation of a more widespread electricity 
infrastructure. 
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2.2 The traditional grid challenged 
 
2.2.1 Electricity demand 
 
Worldwide electricity demand is expected to more than double between 2007 and 
2050. In the Baseline scenario (see APPENDIX A), demand increases by 151% and in 
the BLUE Map scenario (see APPENDIX A) it increases by 117%. This increase is not 
spread equally across regions. Those regions that currently have small electrical 
demands will see the largest growth between 2007 and 2050 (Figure 1). 
 
The need for grid maintenance and expansion will be different for those regions with 
high growth than for those with low growth. The three areas with projected low 
growth (OECD North America, OECD Europe and OECD Pacific) are areas that have a 
large legacy infrastructure that is ageing, the replacement of which is constrained by 
regulatory regimes which set limits on capital expenditure. In areas with greater 
growth, primarily non-OECD member countries, ageing infrastructure and reliability 
are also of concern. But these regions will also be committing to new construction, 
providing an opportunity to deploy modern electricity grid technology and to learn 
from the experience of other regions. The best way forward in some cases may be to 
render existing unreliable or inflexible infrastructure redundant (IEA, 2010). 
 
 
Figure 1: Electricity consumption growth 2007-50 (Source: Technology Roadmap - 
Smart Grids, OECD/IEA, 2011) 
 
2.2.2 Demand profiles - Peak demand 
 
The amount of electrical power required on any system fluctuates throughout the 
day. It also varies over the course of the year between a minimum base load and 
peak load. This aspect is demonstrated by load duration curves that show the 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 03:54:03 EET - 137.108.70.7
14 
 
number of hours that a given average hourly load occurs in an electricity system over 
the course of a year (Figure 2). 
 
These data show that the minimum demand on the system in selected countries and 
regions is less than half of the peak demand. The generation, transmission and 
distribution infrastructure must be designed in a way that it can work reliably within 
this entire range. “In France, for example, the peak 10% of generating capacity is 
only required 3% of the time. And about 20% of the total demand over a year is 
supplied by plants that operate just over 15% of the time. Securing private funding 
for investment in generation capacity to meet peak demand can be difficult if market 
structures do not provide revenue security for such high value, low call-off 
generation” (IEA, 2010). 
 
Baseload is also becoming more important for system management. For many years, 
base load was supplied by large fossil or nuclear plants from which output remained 
virtually constant throughout the year. Recently, fluctuations in electricity supply 
and demand have required large-scale base load plants to curtail and then increase 
their generation output. As a result, there is new interest in developing technologies 
that can enable these plants to provide responsive and flexible generation (Schmitt 
2009). 
 
 
Figure 2: Load duration curves for several countries in 2008 (Source: IEA - Energy 
Technology Perspectives, 2010) 
 
We see how the annual electricity demand on the overall systems varies significantly 
across the year. 
 
Residential and service sector demand varies over the course of the day and 
between seasons (Figure 3). 
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Figure 3: Daily average residential electricity demand in a sample of homes in Florida, 
United States with a high penetration of central air-conditioning load (Source: Parker, 
2002) 
 
The curves in Figure 3 represent a region with large amounts of residential central 
air-conditioning. It would not be representative of many areas in Europe that have 
much lower levels of central air-conditioning. 
 
“The degree to which sector-specific peak demand affects overall electrical systems 
is dependent on its share of the overall electricity power demand. Industrial sectors, 
for example, often make up a large percentage of the electricity demand and 
contractual arrangements are often put in place to curtail their demand in 
circumstances where the grid needs to reduce peak demand. As sector demand 
patterns change in future, with increased residential loads and/or the wider 
electrification of transportation, peaks may become more difficult to manage” (IEA, 
2010). 
 
2.2.3 Electricity Generation - Renewable Energy 
 
Climate change has raised awareness of the effects of increased carbon emissions 
and has focused attention on the negative externalities of the use of electricity and 
its energy sources. Electricity production causes about 40% of Europe’s output of 
GHG emissions (Eskeland, Rive & Mideksa, 2008). 
 
There will be significant changes in the way electricity is generated in the future. In 
addition to large centralized power plants, distributed generation in the form of both 
renewable and non-renewable generation is increasing, including plants connected 
directly to the distribution system and micro-generation at the household level. 
 
Variable renewable energy (varRE) technologies such as wind, solar PV, run of river 
hydro and tidal, present particular challenges to the transmission system (Figure 4). 
Unlike non-variable power generation, where the generation can be contracted and 
dispatched with high degrees of certainty over long time frames and where the 
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fluctuations can be managed in a controlled manner, varRE generation is difficult for 
system operators to predict both in terms of the uncertainty of its availability and 
the short time frame in which the speed and magnitude of any fluctuations can be 
predicted (Boyle, 2009). 
 
“In many electricity systems, merit orders require that all available renewable power 
is used at all times in order to minimize generation emissions or variable costs. This 
means the grid operator needs to manage the available non-variable generation to 
respond to changes in supply from the varRE generation and to meet a constantly 
changing level of demand, so as to maintain grid stability and reliability of supply” 
(IEA, 2010). 
 
Bioenergy, hydropower with water storage, geothermal and concentrating solar 
power generation with thermal storage would be considered as non-variable forms 
of renewable energy (IEA, 2010). 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Global electricity generation mix (Source: IEA - Energy Technology 
Perspectives, 2010) 
 
In the BLUE Map scenario, the progressive decarbonisation of electricity generation 
leads to varRE generation making up 19% of all generation. This proportion ranges 
from 10% to 27% by region by 2050 (Figure 5). 
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Figure 5: Regional generation mix in 2050, BLUE Map scenario (Source: IEA - Energy 
Technology Perspectives, 2010) 
 
Areas with higher amounts of varRE will need grid systems designed to handle their 
variability. Regions that may intend to move to higher levels of varRE will need to 
plan for that as they upgrade and develop their grid systems. 
 
2.2.4 Electricity Network Losses 
 
In the electricity system, more electricity is produced than is actually consumed by 
end users. The balance is lost primarily through direct use in generation plants, 
through transmission and distribution (T&D) losses and through electricity storage 
inefficiency (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Regional electricity system use and loss of electricity, 2007 
 
Source: IEA - Energy Technology Perspectives, 2010 
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Electricity used in generation plants ranges from 3.0% to 8.3%. It can be reduced by 
system improvements and modernization at the plant. T&D losses are larger, 
accounting for more than 9% of all generation worldwide, and vary much more 
between regions. OECD countries and China have the lowest percentage T&D losses, 
ranging from 5.0% to 7.2%. Even so, these losses represent a large amount of 
electricity, equivalent to more than the T&D losses from all other regions combined. 
In non-OECD countries T&D losses are higher as a percentage of total generation. 
 
Many of these losses can be reduced by the modernization of the electricity grid. 
Better system level and end-use metering in particular will enable the losses to be 
identified and resolved. 
 
2.2.5 Electrification of transport 
 
The BLUE Map Scenario estimates that the transport sector will make up 10% of 
overall electricity consumption by 2050 because of a significant increase in electric 
vehicles (EV) and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEV) (Figure 6). If vehicle charging 
is not managed intelligently, it could increase peak loading on the electricity 
infrastructure, adding to current peak demands found in the residential and service 
sectors, and requiring major infrastructure investment to avoid supply failure. 
 
 
Figure 6: Deployment of electric vehicles and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (Source: 
Technology Roadmap - Smart Grids, OECD/IEA, 2011) 
 
2.2.6 Ageing Infrastructure 
 
The electrification of developed countries has occurred over the last 100 years. As 
demand grows and changes (e.g. through deployment of electric vehicles), and 
distributed generation becomes more widespread, ageing distribution and 
transmission infrastructure will need to be replaced and updated, and new 
technologies will need to be deployed. Unfortunately, in many regions, the 
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necessary technology investment is prevented by existing market and regulatory 
structures, which often have long approval processes. Smart grid technologies 
provide an opportunity to maximize the use of existing infrastructure through better 
monitoring and management, while new infrastructure can be more strategically 
deployed (OECD/IEA, 2011). 
 
2.2.7 Electricity Reliability 
 
In the United States there have been five massive blackouts over the past 40 years, 
three of which have occurred in the past nine years. More blackouts and brownouts 
are occurring due to the slow response times of mechanical switches, a lack of 
automated analytics, and “poor visibility” – a “lack of situational awareness” on the 
part of grid operators. This issue of blackouts has far broader implications than 
simply waiting for the lights to come on. Imagine plant production stopped, 
perishable food spoiling, traffic lights dark, and credit card transactions rendered 
inoperable. Such are the effects of even a short regional blackout. Also, in many 
areas of the United States, the only way a utility knows there’s an outage is when a 
customer calls to report it (U.S. Department of Energy). 
 
And what is the cost of these outages? The numbers are staggering and speak for 
themselves: 
 
 A rolling blackout across Silicon Valley totaled $75 million in losses. 
 
 In 2000, the one-hour outage that hit the Chicago Board of Trade resulted in 
$20 trillion in trades delayed. 
 
 Sun Microsystems estimates that a blackout costs the company $1 million 
every minute. 
 
 The Northeast blackout of 2003 resulted in a $6 billion economic loss to the 
region. 
 
 
2.3 Vision for the grid of the future - Smart Grid 
 
2.3.1 Power System Flexibility 
 
A flexible power system can both supplement periods of low variable generation to 
meet demand as required, and manage large surpluses when demand is low. A 
flexible system is one which is able to transport, store, trade and consume electricity 
to maintain reliable supply in the face of rapid changes and potentially very large 
imbalances in supply and demand (IEA, 2010).  
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 03:54:03 EET - 137.108.70.7
20 
 
Power systems worldwide vary enormously in terms of scale, interconnection, 
generation, storage, transmission and distribution, demand behavior, and market 
rules. The most appropriate way to handle large-scale variable renewable energy 
shares will depend on the specific characteristics of the overall system into which the 
renewable energy is being supplied.  
 
“Power systems can be adapted in a number of ways to provide more flexibility to 
balance variable generation including: 
 
 Increasing the size of balancing areas – to enable a geographically larger area 
to rely on a smaller proportion of reserve generation capacity to maintain 
system reliability, to enable imbalances to be resolved where they cost least, 
and to take advantage of the smoother average generation that is likely to 
result from a large geographic spread of renewable energy. 
 
 Demand shaping through demand-side management – using prices to move 
some demand from peak to off-peak periods. 
 
 Improving output forecasting and intra-hour dispatch – to allow more 
efficient scheduling of flexible reserves. 
 
 Increasing control of transmission and distribution assets – to increase 
transmission capacity and reduce congestion during key periods and over 
critical line lengths” (IEA, 2010). 
 
“Once all the options for optimizing the use of existing flexibility resources of a 
system have been exhausted, still larger amounts of renewable energy generation 
will need to be balanced by increased capacity of these resources. Such measures 
may include additional flexible power plant capacity; additional storage capacity; the 
reinforcement and expansion of transmission and distribution networks; and 
interconnection between adjacent grid areas” (IEA, 2010). 
 
2.3.2 Electricity Grid of the Future - What is a Smart Grid? 
 
Growth and change in the electricity system over the next 50 years will require major 
investment. The electricity grid of the future will need to demonstrate the same 
primary functional characteristics as today. But it will need to accomplish this with 
added flexibility in order to enable an environment with a different mix of both 
centralized and distributed, non-variable and variable generation and new demand 
profiles. In order for the grid to operate optimally in this environment, there will be a 
need for the grid to become more intelligent, i.e. to become smarter (IEA, 2010). 
 
What is a smart grid? To understand what is and what is not, it is useful to look at 
Van de Putte’s (2011) definition of the 3 types of intelligent grids: micro grids, smart 
grids and super grids. 
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 Micro grids often cover islands, small towns or districts, where the 
distribution network incorporates monitoring and control infrastructure and 
uses local energy generation sources. The objective of a micro grid is to 
supply local power needs as efficiently as possible. 
 
 Smart grids balance supply and demand out over a region. They use 
advanced types of control and management technologies to efficiently 
distribute power and connect decentralized renewable energy sources and 
cogeneration to the grid. 
 
 Super grids transport large energy loads between regions or countries with 
large supply and large demand, using HVDC technology based 
interconnections. 
 
A smart grid (Figure 7) is an electricity network that uses digital technology to 
monitor and manage the transport of electricity from all generation sources to meet 
the varying electricity demands of end users. Such grids will be able to coordinate 
the needs and capabilities of all generators, grid operators, end users and electricity 
market participants in such a way that it can optimize operation and minimize costs 
and environmental impacts. Also they should maintain system reliability and stability 
(OECD/IEA, 2011). 
 
 
Figure 7: A Smart Grid (Source: Wang, 2009) 
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2.3.3 From hierarchy to network 
 
Today’s power systems are designed to support large generation plants that serve 
faraway consumers via a transmission and distribution system that is essentially one-
way. But the grid of the future will necessarily be a two-way system where power 
generated by a multitude of small, distributed sources — in addition to large plants 
—  lows across a grid based on a network rather than a hierarchical structure (Figure 
8). 
 
 
Figure 8: From hierarchy to network (Source: ABB, 2009) 
 
The diagrams in Figure 8 illustrate this shift. In the first, we see today’s hierarchical 
power system, which looks much like an organizational chart with the large 
generator at the top and consumers at the bottom. The second diagram shows a 
network structure characteristic of a fully implemented smart grid. We can also see 
this shifting in Figure 9. 
 
 
Figure 9: Past, Present and Future (Source: IEA, 2011) 
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2.3.4 Smart Grid Characteristics 
 
The grid is an enabler. It enables sources of generation to be linked to consumers. A 
range of technologies are primarily grid related, as distinct from being generation 
related or consumer related (Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Smart Grid Characteristics 
 
Source: Technology Roadmap - Smart Grids, OECD/IEA, 2011 
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2.4 Smart Grids Technologies 
 
The many smart grid technology areas – each consisting of sets of individual 
technologies – span the entire grid, from generation through transmission and 
distribution to various types of electricity consumers. Some of the technologies are 
being deployed and are considered to work well in their development and 
application, while others require further development. A fully optimized electricity 
system will deploy all the technology areas in Figure 10. However, not all technology 
areas need to be installed to increase the “smartness” of the grid. 
 
 
Figure 10: Smart grid technology areas (Source: Technology Roadmap - Smart Grids, 
OECD/IEA, 2011) 
 
The smart grid technologies are: 
 
(According to U.S. Department of Energy - NETL, 2010 and U.S. Department of 
Commerce - NIST, 2010). 
 
 Wide-area monitoring and control 
 Advanced metering Infrastructure (AMI) - The two-way information  
 Information and communications technology integration 
 Demand response (DR) systems 
 Distributed and renewable electricity generation (DG/RES) 
 Advanced energy storage 
 Electric vehicles (EVs) charging infrastructure 
 Transmission enhancement applications 
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2.4.1 Wide-area monitoring and control 
 
Real-time monitoring and display of power system components and performance, 
across interconnections and over large geographic areas, help system operators to 
understand and optimize power system components, behavior and performance. 
Advanced system operation tools avoid blackouts and facilitate the integration of 
variable renewable energy resources. Monitoring and control technologies along 
with advanced system analytics – including wide-area situational awareness (WASA), 
wide-area monitoring systems (WAMS), and wide-area adaptive protection, control 
and automation (WAAPCA) – generate data to inform decision making, mitigate 
wide-area disturbances, and improve transmission capacity and reliability. 
 
2.4.2 Advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) - The two-way information 
 
Smart Meters form the basis of the intelligence of the new smart grid. The two-way 
information generated by advanced metering allows distribution system operators, 
energy retailers, energy service providers and final customers to improve their 
business efficiency and service performance, avoiding investments in expansion of 
networks and generation. Smart metering will allow utilities to offer consumers real-
time or dynamic pricing, rather than static pricing. Dynamic pricing has shown to 
have the potential to significantly reduce peak power consumption (Faruqui, 2010). 
Smart metering is also a crucial capability for the integration and management of 
decentralized renewable energy production. In Figure 11 we can see the cumulative 
smart meters installation. 
 
 
Figure 11: Cumulative smart meters installation (Source: IEA, Tracking Clean Energy 
Progress, 2013) 
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However, the smart meter on its own will not save energy. It is simply an ‘enabler’, a 
tool that allows for better energy management. Any smart-meter rollout involves 
not just the meter manufacturers but also communications companies, advanced 
metering infrastructure (AMI) program management, meter data management 
systems (MDMS) and system integration. According to research by ZPryme 
(Rodriguez, 2010), less than half of the market potential of AMI is made up of the 
meters, the rest going to the supporting technology. 
 
2.4.3 Demand response (DR) systems 
 
Demand response systems can help in dealing with the higher peak demand caused 
by e.g. EVs and renewable energy. Broadly speaking DR stands for the 
communication about the electricity use and price changes in the market between 
the utility and the consumer. Through flexible pricing at time of use, consumers can 
minimize their electricity bill by choosing (or letting the EMS choose) to consume at 
times of low prices instead of at peak demand, and utilities can balance or level the 
load consumption patterns. This in turn can help to avoid investments in new power 
plants, conserve resources and moderate energy prices. 
 
Where today only static pricing or, at most, day/night time tariffs exist, the range of 
different pricing schemes will expand offering real-time or dynamic pricing to 
consumers. Generally three types of pricing schemes can be identified (Ekanayake, 
2012): 
 
 ToU rates: predefined, different prices for different time blocks. Its most 
common form is the day/night time rates. It’s the least efficient or effective 
in reducing peak demand. 
 
 Real-time pricing (RTP): the electricity prices fluctuate hourly based on the 
wholesale electricity price. Hourly rates are announced in advance. RTP is the 
most efficient & effective, but is very complex and volatile. 
 
 Critical peak pricing (CPP): a hybrid design of ToU and CPP. The basic rate 
structure is ToU, although utilities are earlier in informing about peak 
days/hours. However, the peak hour price is increased substantially. 
 
 
As proven in more than 70 pilots, the reduction of peak demand in response to 
dynamic pricing ranges up to 58% and averages about 20%. These customer 
responses do persist over time with 22 some pilots operating already since 1990. 
Over 90% of low income customers saved money in various pilots (Faruqui, 2011). 
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Figure 12: Load Shifting (Source: Ekanayake, 2012) 
 
Figure 12 illustrates the case of load shifting; the demand response system causes a 
consumption shift between times of the day from on-peak to off-peak consumption. 
In this case the use of the washing machine (consuming 1kW/2h) was shifted to an 
off-peak period. The total energy consumption is left unchanged. 
 
 
Figure 13: Valley Filling (Source: Ekanayake, 2012) 
 
Figure 13 shows the case of valley filling. Again the goal is to decrease on-peak 
demand. Valley filling solves this issue by storing energy in the off-peak period in for 
example a plug-in electric vehicle or electric storage heater and releasing this energy 
in the on-peak period. However, in this case the total energy consumption has 
increased, as storing electricity also consumes electricity. 
 
 
Figure 14: Peak Clipping (Source: Ekanayake, 2012) 
 
Peak clipping reduces the peak load demand, especially when demand approaches 
the thermal limits of feeders/transformers, or the supply limits of the whole system. 
Peak clipping (Figure 14) is primarily done through direct load control of domestic 
appliances, for example, reducing thermostat setting of space heaters or control of 
electric water heaters or air-conditioning units. As peak clipping reduces the energy 
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consumed by certain loads (in Figure 14, 2 kWh of energy is reduced), often 
consumers have to reduce their comfort. 
 
 
Figure 15: Energy Efficiency Improvement (Source: Ekanayake, 2012) 
 
Energy efficiency programs are intended to reduce the overall use of energy. 
Approaches include offering incentives to adopt energy-efficient appliances, lighting, 
and other end-uses; or strategies that encourage more efficient electricity use, for 
example, the feedback of consumption and cost data to consumers, can lead to a 
reduction in total energy consumption. Figure 15 shows the reduction in energy 
demand when ten 60 W filament lamps (operating from 18.00 hrs to 22.00 hrs) are 
replaced by 20 W Compact fluorescent lamps (Ekanayake, 2012). 
 
2.4.4 Information and communications technology integration 
 
Underlying communications infrastructure, whether using private utility 
communication networks (radio networks, meter mesh networks) or public carriers 
and networks (Internet, cellular, cable or telephone), support data transmission for 
deferred and real-time operation, and during outages. Along with communication 
devices, significant computing, system control software and enterprise resource 
planning software support the two-way exchange of information between 
stakeholders, and enable more efficient use and management of the grid. 
 
2.4.5 Renewable and distributed generation integration 
 
Whereas on a traditional grid, power generation was centralized and transmission 
and distribution were one-way, the metering capabilities and two-way 
communication of smart grids enable the production of electricity in numerous, 
decentralized locations. The growth of renewable power production, micro- or large 
scale, such as the offshore wind parks, is increasing the need for a smart grid that is 
able to balance these intermittent resources. 
 
Distributed generation allows electricity to be produced by utilities or by individuals, 
closer to the point of consumption, thus reducing energy transmission losses. It 
helps utilities to meet peak power needs more easily and diversify the range of 
energy resources, lowering the cost of distribution and increasing the reliability of 
the power flow (Roehr, 2010). 
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Distributed generation is a driver behind the reduction of electricity costs for 
consumers and increases the use of renewables. Power production in distributed 
locations can be small scale and individual “prosumers” (consumers that also micro-
produce) have the option to resell their production to the utility. This is completely 
changing the relationship between utilities and consumers. 
 
The development of distributed generation is driven by environmental concerns, 
deregulation of the electricity market, diversification of energy sources/energy 
autonomy and energy efficiency, while barriers are mainly technical constraints, such 
as design procedures, limitations on rural network capacity, fault level restrictions in 
urban areas and a lack of interconnection standards (ENERGnet, 2003). 
 
2.4.6 Transmission enhancement applications 
 
The transmission system operators (TSOs) are responsible for transmitting high-
voltage electricity from producers to distribution system operators (DSOs). In many 
ways they are the backbone of the electricity system conveying large amounts of 
electric energy across borders, countries and regions. Whereas a failure in the 
distribution system has but little effect, a transmission equipment failure cascades 
into causing huge blackouts. 
 
Transmission enhancement applications help to avoid such blackouts and achieve 
higher efficiency levels. Improvements also aid in coping with the integration of 
energy resources in remote places such as offshore windmill parks. The system 
employs advanced sensors in the form of e.g. phasor measurement units and new-
operator simulation and visualization tools which provide better data on the 
situation on the ground. The improved availability of this data together with high-
speed communications enable building a more dynamic management of the 
transmission system (Electric Power Research Institute, 2011). 
 
2.4.7 Electric vehicle charging infrastructure 
 
The development of electric transportation and the smart grid go hand-in-hand. 
Deployment of electric vehicles (EV) will be an important means to reduce society’s 
CO2 footprint, but also provides a very promising alternative as electricity storage 
capacity, feeding power back into the grid if necessary (Vehicle-to-grid V2G). 
 
However, especially in the early stages of deployment, it is expected that electric 
cars will exist in clusters. If they all charge at night, it could place enormous stresses 
on local transformers, and it is likely that investments need to be made in 
transformer upgrades. In order not to increase peak power demand because of 
electrical cars, the battery loading patterns should be carefully planned. EV power 
demand could be managed through “smart charging” programs, making use of 
flexible pricing incentives. Another application that is being developed is “smart 
billing”, that allows the EV to be charged at different locations at the cost of the 
vehicle owner and not the property owner. Both smart charging and smart billing 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 03:54:03 EET - 137.108.70.7
30 
 
require a high level of communication between customer, electric car and utility, for 
which sophisticated software is required (van der Zanden, 2011). 
 
2.4.8 Advanced Energy Storage 
 
The unpredictable nature of renewable power puts different stresses on the physical 
grid than conventional power. The load fluctuations must be managed through 
automated distribution technologies, highly flexible conventional power generation 
or storage. The increasing penetration of renewable electricity generation sources is 
driving the need for energy storage. Energy storage enables utilities to supply peak 
demand with lower generation capacity and facilitates the integration of renewable 
energy sources into the grid. Future applications could include time-of-use energy 
cost management for the commercial and industrial segments and transmission and 
distribution deferral for utilities. 
 
Grid operators with access to hydropower can store power by pumping up water 
behind dams and releasing it to generate power at times of high demand. Countries 
with no access to hydropower are experimenting with power storage in CHP 
(combined heat and power) plants, home heat pumps or EV (electric vehicle) 
batteries. Other technologies for storage include fuel cells, sodium sulphur (NAS) 
batteries, compressed air (CAES), flywheels and molten salt. New developments are 
in lithium ion batteries, ultra capacitors and flow batteries. No ideal storage solution 
has been developed yet and this area is being watched with great expectation (van 
der Zanden, 2011). 
 
2.5 Benefits of Smart Grids 
 
Smart grids will offer the capability (according to Gridwise Alliance): 
 
 To reduce peak demand by actively managing consumer demand: more 
appliances and equipment are expected to come onto the market that can 
respond to both consumer and utility operator priorities. As they do, the 
ability to manage power requirements in both directions – to the utility as 
well as from the utility – will reduce the need for power. For example, during 
high-use periods such as hot summer afternoons when the cost of producing 
and delivering power is extremely high, the system will enable consumers 
more directly to be informed of those costs and to reduce their demand, or 
increase their local generation output, accordingly. 
 
 To balance consumer reliability and power quality needs: although some uses 
of electricity require near perfect reliability and quality, others are almost 
insensitive to these needs. A smart grid will be able to distinguish differences 
in demand and, where appropriate, to provide less reliable and lower quality 
power at a reduced cost. 
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 To encourage the proactive application of energy efficiency opportunities: a 
smart grid will furnish consumers and utilities with accurate, timely and 
detailed information about energy use. Armed with this information, 
consumers will be able to identify ways of reducing energy consumption with 
minimal impacts on safety, comfort and security. 
 
 To improve overall operational efficiency: smart grids will become 
increasingly automated and smart sensors and controls will be integral to 
their design and operation. Utility operators will be able more easily to 
identify, diagnose and correct problems, and will even have the capability to 
anticipate problems before they happen. 
 
 To integrate clean energy technologies: EVs, rooftop solar systems, wind 
farms and storage devices will become essential parts of the grid, all 
contributing in a coordinated fashion to the achievement of economic and 
environmental goals. 
 
3.  Markets and Energy Economics 
 
3.1 Market 
 
Fundamentally, a market is a place where buyers and sellers meet to see and 
negotiate if deals can be made over commodities at that point of time or in the 
future. 
 
“Market is an actual or nominal place where forces of demand and supply operate, 
and where buyers and sellers interact (directly or through intermediaries) to trade 
goods, services or contracts or instruments, for money or barter” (Business 
Dictionary). 
 
“Markets include mechanisms for: 
 
 Determining price of the traded item 
 Communicating the price information 
 Facilitating deals and transactions, and 
 Effecting distribution 
 
 
The market for a particular item is made up of existing and potential customers who 
need it and have the ability and willingness to pay for it”. (Business dictionary) 
 
The Oxford dictionary of Economics defines a market as “A place or institution in 
which buyers and sellers of a good or asset meet” 
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It can be said that a market is the process by which the prices of goods and services 
are established. 
3.2 Buyers and Sellers 
 
3.2.1 Demand 
 
Buyers, of course, are the parties that demand for the commodities by trading them 
with money or some other commodities. There are a few factors that determine the 
behavior of the buyers in a market which in turn affect the demand for a commodity. 
Among the main factors are price, quality, quantity and timing. Given that other non-
price factors are precisely defined, the demand behavior is very much dependent on 
the price of a commodity. The quantity of a commodity bought by buyers normally 
increases with the decrease in the price and vice versa. In short, there is an inverse 
relationship between price and quantity demanded. Economists call this inverse 
relationship the law of demand. The demand curve is shown in Figure 16. 
 
 
Figure 16: Demand Curve, (Kirschen and Strbac, 2004) 
Figure 16 shows the typical relationship between the price of a commodity and the 
quantity of the demand for the commodity by the consumers. This relationship can 
be seen from two perspectives. The first perspective sees how the difference in 
commodity price can affect the quantity of the demand of the commodity. As 
mentioned earlier, under this perspective, the demand decreases as the price 
increases. This is the case when the consumers have the alternatives to one 
particular commodity. When the price of this commodity goes up beyond the 
acceptable level for the consumers, they will go for other alternative commodities 
which results in decreasing in quantity of demand of the first commodity. 
 
On the other hand, the second perspective sees the relationship in Figure 16 as the 
price that the consumers are willing to pay to have a small additional amount of a 
commodity. It also tells how much money these consumers would want to receive as 
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a compensation for a reduced consumption (Kirschen and Strbac, 2004). Considering 
this second perspective, from Figure 16, it indicates that the consumers or buyers 
are willing to pay a high price for an additional commodity if they only have a small 
amount of that commodity. In contrast, their marginal willingness to pay for this 
commodity decreases when their consumption increases. 
 
3.2.1.1 Elasticity of Demand 
 
Increasing the price of a commodity even by a small amount will clearly decrease 
demand. We can use the derivative dq/dπ of the demand curve (see Figure 16 
above) to see how the demand is decreasing when the price increases. With q we 
represent the quantity of a commodity and with π we represent the price. Using this 
slope directly presents the problem that the numerical value depends on the units 
that we use to measure the quantity and the price. Comparing the demand’s 
response to price changes for various commodities would be impossible. To get 
around this difficulty, we define the price elasticity of demand. Kirschen and Strbac 
define the “price elasticity of demand as the ratio of the relative change in demand 
to the relative change in price”: 
 
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
The demand for a commodity is said to be elastic if a given percentage change in 
price produces a larger percentage change in demand.  
 
On the other hand, if the relative change in demand is smaller than the relative 
change in price then the demand is inelastic to the price. This is the case in certain 
commodities like electrical energy especially if it is viewed in a short term horizon. 
 
3.2.1.2 Changes in Demand 
 
A change in one or more of the determinants of demand (e.g. changing the behavior 
of buyers because of changes in price, quality or quantity) will change the location of 
the demand curve (Figure 17). Graphically, a shift in the demand curve is called a 
change in demand. If consumers desire to buy more of a commodity at each possible 
price, that increase in demand is shown as a shift of the demand curve to the right, 
say, from D1 to D2. Conversely, a decrease in demand occurs when consumers buy 
fewer of a commodity at each possible price. The leftward shift of the demand curve 
from D1 to D3 in Figure 17 shows that situation. 
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Figure 17: Changes in the Demand (McConnell Brief) 
 
3.2.2 Supply 
 
As for the sellers, they are a group of parties that produce or supply the commodities 
or services to the buyers. The behavior of the suppliers and hence the supply of a 
commodity is also very much related to the market price. The volume of supply of a 
commodity in a market will go higher when the market price is high enough relative 
to the production cost. This is because the producers or the suppliers will find it 
worthwhile to increase their production of a commodity when the market price is 
high. This definitely affects the quantity of commodity that is available to be sold to 
the buyers in the market. 
 
The relationship between quantities of supply of a commodity in a market with the 
market price is given by the supply curve graph as shown in Figure 18. 
 
 
 
Figure 18: Supply Curve (Kirschen and Strbac, 2004) 
 
In Figure 19 below, commodities produced by different producers are tabulated 
along the supply curve. This will break the producers down into three categories 
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which are marginal producers, infra-marginal producers and extra-marginal 
producers. The marginal producers are the producers whose production costs equal 
to market price. Marginal producers will find that their productions are not 
worthwhile if the market price decreases.  
 
On the other hand, the production cost for infra-producers is below the market 
price. This enables this kind of producers to put their price above their minimum 
worthwhile price and at the same time remain below the market price. As for extra-
producers, the production cost for this kind of producers is above the market price. 
They will only find that their production is worthwhile when the market price 
increases. Hence, due to the different in production cost, the different producers of 
a commodity would have to adjust their amount of supply at different price 
thresholds. All these are summarized in Figure 19 as shown below. 
 
 
Figure 19: Type of Producers in respect to Market Price (Kirschen and Strbac, 2004) 
 
As for the Elasticity of Supply, the rate of change of quantity of supply relative to the 
rate of change of market price is called Price Elasticity of Supply. The elasticity of 
supply is always positive and its value is normally higher in a long run since the 
suppliers have the opportunity to increase the means of production. 
 
3.2.2.1 Changes in Supply 
 
In constructing a supply curve, the price is the most significant influence on the 
quantity supplied of any product. But other factors can and do affect supply. The 
supply curve is drawn on the assumption that these other things are fixed and do not 
change. If one of them does change, a change in supply will occur, meaning that the 
entire supply curve will shift. 
 
“The basic determinants of supply are (1) resource prices, (2) technology, (3) taxes 
and subsidies, (4) prices of other goods, (5) expected price, and (6) the number of 
sellers in the market. A change in any one or more of these determinants of supply, 
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or supply shifters, will move the supply curve for a product either right or left” 
(McConnell Brief). 
 
A shift to the right, as from S1 to S2 in Figure 20, signifies an increase in supply: 
Producers supply larger quantities of the product at each possible price. A shift to 
the left, as from S1 to S3, indicates a decrease in supply: Producers offer less output 
at each price. 
 
 
Figure 20: Changes in Supply (McConnell Brief) 
 
3.2.3 Market Equilibrium 
 
In the competitive electricity market large numbers of producers compete with each 
other to satisfy the wants and needs of a large number of consumers. Consumers 
help balance supply and demand, and ensure reliability by modifying the way they 
use and purchase a commodity. Customers have demands that are sensitive to price, 
and higher prices produce lower demands. In this way, we reach a point where the 
quantity demanded by consumers at current price will equal the quantity supplied by 
producers. So in a competitive market, a market is said to be in equilibrium state 
when the quantity that the suppliers are willing to provide is equal to the quantity 
(q) that the consumers wish to obtain. Market equilibrium happens at equilibrium 
price or market clearing price (π*). 
 
The market equilibrium can be illustrated using the demand curve and supply curve 
as shown in Figure 21. In this situation, the quantity of a commodity and the market 
price will settle at the intersection of these two curves. 
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Figure 21: Market Equilibrium (Kirschen and Strbac, 2004) 
 
When a competitive market is allowed to operate freely, the resulted equilibrium 
price will push the consumers’ surplus and producers’ profit to the maximum level. 
However should external interventions take place, this will prevent the price from 
settling at equilibrium price and hence the surplus and profits are not maximized. 
Figure 22 below shows the consequences when a commodity price settles higher or 
lower than the equilibrium price. 
 
Consumers’ surplus is defined as the difference between the price that a consumer is 
willing to pay and the actual price that they pay. 
 
 
Figure 22: Stability of the market equilibrium (Kirschen and Strbac, 2004) 
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If the market price settles higher than the equilibrium price, the demand will reduce, 
this in turn leaves the producers with excess supply. In this situation, the producers 
will normally reduce their production so that the amount of commodities that they 
are willing to sell is equal to the amount that the consumers are willing to buy. 
 
On the other hand, if the market price is lower than the equilibrium price, only 
limited number of producers will find that the price is worthwhile to produce goods. 
This will reduce the availability of supply in the market (shortage or excess demand) 
which leaves some amount of demand unsatisfied. Hence, in a competitive market, 
market price that is equal to the equilibrium price will basically help to give full 
advantage to both the producers and the consumers. 
 
3.3 Changes in Demand, Supply and Equilibrium 
 
3.3.1 Changes in Demand 
 
If supply of some good is constant and the demand for the good increases (Figure 23 
below), as a result, the new intersection of the supply and demand curves is at 
higher values on both the price and the quantity axes. Clearly, an increase in demand 
raises both equilibrium price and equilibrium quantity. Conversely, a decrease in 
demand (Figure 24 below), reduces both equilibrium price and equilibrium quantity. 
 
 
Figure 23: Increase in Demand                      Figure 24: Decrease in Demand 
Source: (McConnell Brief) 
 
3.3.2 Changes in Supply 
 
If the demand for some good is constant but the supply increases (Figure 25 below), 
the new intersection of supply and demand is located at a lower equilibrium price 
but at a higher equilibrium quantity. An increase in supply reduces equilibrium price 
but increases equilibrium quantity. In contrast, if supply decreases (Figure 26), 
equilibrium price rises while equilibrium quantity declines. 
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Figure 25: Increase in Supply                         Figure 26: Decrease in Supply 
Source: (McConnell Brief) 
 
As we see in Figures 23-26, Changes in demand and supply and the effects on price 
and quantity. The increase in demand from D1 to D2 in (Figure 23) increases both 
equilibrium price and equilibrium quantity. The decrease in demand from D3 to D4 in 
(Figure 24) decreases both equilibrium price and equilibrium quantity. The increase 
in supply from S1 to S2 in (Figure 25) decreases equilibrium price and increases 
equilibrium quantity. The decrease in supply from S3 to S4 in (Figure 26) increases 
equilibrium price and decreases equilibrium quantity. The upward arrows in the 
boxes signify increases in equilibrium price (P) and equilibrium quantity (Q). The 
downward arrows signify decreases in these items. 
 
3.4 Complex Cases 
 
When both supply and demand change, the effect is a combination of the individual 
effects. 
 
3.4.1 Supply Increase and Demand Decrease 
 
A supply increase for some good and a demand decrease will affect the equilibrium 
price. Both changes decrease price, so the net result is a price drop greater than that 
resulting from either change alone. But in the case of equilibrium quantity the 
effects of the changes in supply and demand are opposed. The increase in supply 
increases equilibrium quantity, but the decrease in demand reduces it. The direction 
of the change in equilibrium quantity depends on the relative sizes of the changes in 
supply and demand. If the increase in supply is larger than the decrease in demand, 
the equilibrium quantity will increase. But if the decrease in demand is greater than 
the increase in supply, the equilibrium quantity will decrease. 
 
3.4.2 Supply Decrease and Demand Increase 
 
A decrease in supply and an increase in demand for some good both increase price. 
Their combined effect is an increase in equilibrium price greater than that caused by 
either change separately. But their effect on the equilibrium quantity is again 
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indeterminate, depending on the relative sizes of the changes in supply and demand. 
If the decrease in supply is larger than the increase in demand, the equilibrium 
quantity will decrease. In contrast, if the increase in demand is greater than the 
decrease in supply, the equilibrium quantity will increase. 
 
3.4.3 Supply Increase and Demand Increase 
 
If supply and demand both increase for some good the effects are opposed. A supply 
increase drops equilibrium price, while a demand increase boosts it. If the increase in 
supply is greater than the increase in demand, the equilibrium price will fall. If the 
opposite holds, the equilibrium price will rise. If the two changes are equal and 
cancel out, price will not change. The effect on equilibrium quantity is certain. The 
increases in supply and in demand both raise the equilibrium quantity. Therefore, 
the equilibrium quantity will increase by an amount greater than that caused by 
either change alone. 
 
3.4.4 Supply Decrease and Demand Decrease 
 
And the last case is about decreases in both supply and demand for some good. If 
the decrease in supply is greater than the decrease in demand, equilibrium price will 
rise. If the reverse is true, equilibrium price will fall. If the two changes are of the 
same size and cancel out, price will not change. Because the decreases in supply and 
demand both reduce equilibrium quantity, we can be sure that equilibrium quantity 
will fall. 
 
 
3.5 Types of markets 
 
The previous section has described and concluded that a market is a mechanism for 
matching supply and demand of a commodity through an equilibrium price. In 
addition to that, there are a few types of markets that serve different purposes of 
trading. 
 
The types of markets are determined by following matters: 
 
 The date of delivery of the commodities 
 The mode of settlement 
 Conditions that might be attached to the transaction 
 
The way the buyers and sellers settle those matters will define the type of market 
that they involve in. Each type of market will be discussed in the following 
subsections. 
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3.5.1 Spot Market 
 
In a spot market, seller delivers the goods immediately and the buyer pays on the 
spot. This type of market is very straight forward whereby there is no condition 
attached to it. Spot market has the advantage of immediacy. The sellers can sell the 
amount that they have available while for the consumers, they can purchase the 
exact amount that they need. 
 
However, in a spot market, the price of the goods tends to change quickly. It is very 
much influenced by the demand and supply. The price will easily go up when the 
demand exceeds the available supply and vice versa. A sudden increase in demand 
(or a drop in production) sends the price soaring because the stock of goods 
available for immediate delivery may be limited. Similarly, a glut in production or a 
dip in demand depresses the price. The price in the spot market is also affected by 
the speculations and news about the future availability of a commodity. The 
unpredictable price of goods in spot market makes life harder for the traders as they 
are exposed to various risks. 
 
Another type of market is needed by this kind of traders in order to protect them 
from those risks especially. Forward markets, future markets and a few others are 
quite useful for the traders to get their interest protected. 
 
3.5.2 Forward Contract and Forward Markets 
 
If in the future, the sellers or producers do not want to risk their goods to be sold at 
a lower price while the buyers at the same time don’t want to bear the risk of buying 
at high price, these sellers and buyers can “lock in” in the price by signing a forward 
contract. 
 
A forward contract specifies the following matters: 
 
 quantity and quality of the commodities to be delivered 
 date of delivery 
 date of payment following delivery 
 penalties if fail to meet the commitment 
 the price to be paid 
 
The agreed price is based on their estimate of spot price at the delivery time. 
However, if at the delivery time, the spot price is higher than the agreed price, the 
forward contract will present a loss to the seller because they cannot sell their good 
at higher price while the buyer can enjoy the surplus as they pay a price which is 
lower than the spot price. 
 
On the other hand, if the spot price is lower than the agreed price, the buyers will 
take turn to be at loss as they have to buy the goods at a price higher than the spot 
price. This time around, the sellers will gain profit out of the forward contract. 
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“If enough sellers and buyers are interested in signing forward contracts of a 
commodity, then a forward market for that commodity will develop. This forward 
market opens up a larger number of possible trading partners which in a way helps 
to determine whether the price that is being offered is reasonable or not” (Kirschen 
and Strbac, 2004). 
 
In some cases, at some points, two parties may want to negotiate all the details of a 
forward contract. This is the case when the contract is to cover the delivery of a large 
quantity over a long period of time or if special need to be discussed. This kind of 
negotiation somehow is very expensive that lead the parties to use standardized 
terms and conditions. 
 
This standardization makes possible the resale of future contract. For example, if a 
company realizes that it will not need all the commodity for which it has signed 
forward contracts, rather than wait until the contracted date of delivery to sell the 
excess commodity on the spot market, it can resell the forward contracts it holds to 
other companies. On the other hand producers who have signed contracts may 
realize that they have overestimated the quantity that they will be able to produce. 
If they cannot deliver the quantities specified in the contracts, they will have to 
cover the deficit by buying the commodity on the spot market. Rather than hope 
that the spot price will be favorable on the date of delivery, these producers could 
buy the forward contract from a company which sell its contract to offset their 
anticipated deficit. The price at which forward contracts are traded will be the 
current market price for forward contracts with the same delivery date. Depending 
on the market’s view of the evolution of the spot price, this resale price may be 
higher or lower than the price agreed by the originators of the contract. This 
secondary market helps the parties to manage their price risk (or their exposure to 
fluctuations in the spot price) and at the same time conform to the conditions of the 
contract (Kirschen and Strbac, 2004). 
 
3.5.3 Future Contracts and Future Markets 
 
A contract is called a future contract when it does not involve physical delivery which 
means there are parties that buy a contract for delivery in the future with the 
intention to sell it later at a higher price. From another perspective, this can be seen 
as parties that sell a contract first with hope to get a new one at a lower price. The 
parties that buy and sell the future contracts are called speculators. According to 
Kirschen and Strbac, as the date of delivery approaches, the speculators must 
balance their position because they cannot produce, consume or store the 
commodity. 
 
In spot markets, producers and buyers are exposed to some other risks other than 
price risk. Hence, with the existence of speculators in future market they prefer to 
transfer the price risk by paying the speculator to take care of this additional risk. As 
for the speculators, they can easily offset the losses in the future market as 
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speculators normally have good financial position. Furthermore, speculators do not 
restrict themselves to one commodity but they involve in future contracts of other 
commodities as well which in a way reduce their exposure to any possible risks. 
 
The market as a whole benefits from the participation of speculators even though 
sometimes they make a lot of profit from their trades. This is because the 
participation of speculators increases the diversity of the market participants. This 
makes physical participants (those who produce or consume the commodity) to find 
their counterparties for their trades more easily and hence increase the liquidity of 
the market. The increase in liquidity may help the market to discover the price of a 
commodity (Kirschen and Strbac, 2004). 
 
3.5.4 Options 
 
Futures and forwards contracts are firm contracts in the sense that delivery is 
unconditional. Any seller who is unable to deliver the quantity agreed must buy the 
missing amount on the spot market. Similarly, any buyer who cannot take full 
delivery must sell the excess on the spot market. In other words, imbalances are 
liquidated at the spot price on the date of delivery. 
 
Unlike forward and future contract, options are contracts that come with a 
conditional delivery and this condition will only be exercised if the holder feels that it 
is worthwhile to do so. They are two varieties of options which are calls options and 
puts options. 
 
A call option gives the holder (consumer) the right to buy a given amount of 
commodity at a price, which called exercise price, in a future date. On the other 
hand, a put option is the right for the holder (producer) to sell a given amount of 
commodity at the exercise price in a future date. 
 
The exercise of the rights is very much depends on the spot market price of a 
commodity. If an exercise price of a call option is lower than the spot market price, 
then the holder (consumer) will find it worthwhile to have the option exercised. 
However, if the exercise price is higher, the holder (consumer) has the right not to 
exercise the option and they can get the goods from the spot market instead. Same 
goes to put option whereby the holder (producer) can choose not to exercise the 
option if the exercise price is lower than the spot market price. On the other hand, 
the holder (producer) will definitely exercise their right if the exercise price is higher 
than the spot market price. 
 
Hence, buying an option contract can therefore be considered as a way for the 
holder (consumer or producer) of the contract to protect itself against the risk of 
having to trade the commodity at a price less favorable than the spot market 
(Kirschen and Strbac, 2004). 
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3.5.5 Contracts for Difference 
 
In some cases, sometimes the price of a commodity is controlled by a centralized 
market. This gives the traders no option of making use of forward market, future 
market or options to reduce their risks. In this case, contracts for difference can be 
used whereby the parties will agree on the amount of the commodity and also a 
price which is called strike price. 
 
After the agreement has been made, the parties will enter the centralized market 
like other participants do. Once the trading on the centralized market is completed, 
the contract of difference is settled as follows. 
 
If the strike price is lower than the centralized market price, the buyers will pay the 
sellers the difference between the strike price and the market price times the 
amount of the commodity agreed in the contract. 
 
If the strike price is higher than the centralized market price, the sellers will pay the 
buyers the difference between these two prices times the amount of the commodity 
agreed in the contract. 
 
In general, contracts for difference are a combination of a call option and a put 
option with the same exercise price which is applied in a centralized market. From all 
the market types described above, the spot market price appears as an indicator that 
drives all prices in other markets. This is because the spot market is the last resort 
where all the parties will refer if any imbalances occur in any of the markets. Hence, 
the spot market plays a fairly important role in matching the supply and demand. 
 
 
3.6 Characteristics of electricity markets 
 
When applying economic theory to electricity markets there are two major 
difficulties concerning the nature of demand and supply. Firstly, elasticity of demand 
is very low if not zero. Secondly, the characteristics of supply costs in electricity 
markets are not compatible with the assumptions made in competitive economics, 
as we so them before when analyzing the market equilibrium. We will see how 
supply and demand are usually presented in electricity markets and their main 
characteristics. 
 
3.6.1 Supply 
 
Supply in electricity markets is the combined output of all generators used to satisfy 
the consumer’s demand for electricity. As in any market, the supply curve shows the 
total amount offered for sale at any given price for any given period. In the short 
term electricity supply is considered to be fixed. In the long term the production 
capacity may be changed (Boisseleau, 2004). 
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When an electricity market is defined, the total electricity supply is usually 
represented by a merit order curve. Such curves range from the least expensive to 
the most expensive units. We can see in figure 27 the representation of a supply 
curve. The merit order curve presents the costs and capacities of all generators. 
There are many differences between costs. Usually the differences between 
production costs occur because of the different technologies that are being used, 
related to the fuel. For example, hydropower plants usually have lower marginal 
costs than gas powered plants. 
 
 
Figure 27: Merit order curve, (Boisseleau, 2004) 
 
There are three main characteristics of electricity supply that must be considered. 
Different cost levels, non-convexity of generator costs and concentrated structure of 
the market. 
 
“In a single power plant, the characteristics of supply are not compatible with 
assumptions of competitive economics because production costs are not convex. 
Convex costs have the property that twice as much output always costs at least 
twice as much to produce (Stoft, 2002). Electricity production costs are not convex 
due mainly to the existence of startup costs and no-load-costs” (Boisseleau, 2004). 
 
“For instance, if the startup cost of a plant is 20 Euro/MWh and if its marginal cost is 
25, producing one MWh over two hours would cost 70 Euro/MWh while producing 
two MWh in the same period would only cost 120 Euro/MWh. Hence, producing 
twice as much is cheaper per unit. This characteristic is important when estimating 
the real cost of production in a competitive environment” (Boisseleau, 2004). 
 
Finally, the number of sellers in many countries is still law today and that is an 
important problem for establishing a competitive market. This is because the past 
years electricity industry was organized as a monopoly and in many countries most 
power plants are still owned by a small number of producers. This market structure 
is an important barrier in the creation of competitive electricity markets. 
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3.6.2 Demand 
 
Demand in electricity markets as the quantity of electricity that end-users are willing 
to consume at any given price. Electricity demand has three important features: 
seasonal variations, segmentation of consumers and low elasticity. 
 
We can see an example in Figure 28 of seasonable variations of electricity 
consumption in France in 2001. 
 
 
 
Figure 28: The seasonable variations of electricity consumption in France 2001 
(Boisseleau, 2004) 
 
Also we can summarize (see Figure 29) the seasonal variations in demand in a load 
curve which plots demand against duration. Such a curve can be constructed for 
different time scales and areas (Boisseleau, 2004). 
 
 
Figure 29: Load duration curve (Boisseleau, 2004) 
 
The demand of electricity varies widely between peak time (day) and off peak time 
(night) and seasons (winter/summer). This variation is simply due to the fact that 
most companies and households do not consume electricity during the night. Very 
high peaks of demand occur during very hot or very cold weekdays when everyone is 
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using air conditioning or electric heating. The lowest levels of demand for electricity 
occur in the middle of the night. 
 
Demand, according to Boisseleau (2004) can be divided into several segments 
according to the level of need and sensitivity to price change of its buyers. “Different 
categories can be defined to improve the transparency of electricity prices charged 
to industrial end-users and domestic consumers. Domestic consumers and industrial 
consumers are broken down into three categories according to their level of 
electricity consumption: small, medium and large consumers” (Boisseleau, 2004). 
 
Lastly, the elasticity of demand is a sensitive issue in electricity markets. As in any 
market, the elasticity of demand represents how consumers react in a change in 
price, in this case electricity prices. In electricity markets elasticity of demand is very 
low. There are not many alternatives for the consumers and also electricity is a 
product which is very important for the consumers. 
 
 
4. Design of a competitive electricity market 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
One of the aims behind the restructuring of the electricity industry was to allow 
market forces to play a greater role in the operation and planning of power systems. 
The basic expectations of such a change were that efficiency would increase and that 
electricity prices would decline without compromising reliability (Kockar, 2003). 
 
“Electricity market restructuring emphasizes the potential for competition in 
generation and retail services, with operation of distribution and transmission wires 
as a monopoly” (Hogan, 1998). 
 
The traditional electricity system is separated into generation, transmission and 
distribution. But this separation is insufficient. The first step for restructuring the 
electricity market emphasizes the unbundling of the traditional vertical integrated 
utilities into separate commercial units that operate independently of each other. 
These commercial units - generation, transmission and distribution – will operate 
independently and the security of the system operation will be handled by an 
independent entity which is called system operator (S.O.). The economic operation 
of a power system is managed by a market operator responsible for balancing supply 
and demand and for setting prices. 
 
4.2 Electricity market design 
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4.2.1 Three levels of market design 
 
When introducing competition in the electricity sector we must define which activity 
should be organized based on market mechanisms and competition and which 
activity should stay a monopoly and be regulated (Boisseleau, 2004). 
 
Three levels of market design can be identified according to Boisseleau (Figure 30). 
The first level refers to market design as the whole value chain of the electricity 
industry from generation to final load, including both wholesale and retail electricity 
markets. In the second level, authors like Hogan (1998) refer only to the wholesale 
market and includes short-term spot markets, bilateral transactions, transmission 
congestion contracts, networks access charges and more. And finally in the third 
level, there are authors refer to market design as the detailed functioning of a 
marketplace such as the type of auction, the format of bids and the rules governing 
the marketplace (Boisseleau, 2004).  
 
The second type of market restructuring - the wholesale market design as explained 
by Hogan - it is going to be analyzed later in this chapter. 
 
 
Figure 30: Three levels of market design (Boisseleau, 2004) 
 
As we said in the previous chapter, markets exist wherever buyers and sellers 
interact to buy or sell a product at a mutually agreed price. The Oxford dictionary of 
Economics defines a market as “A place or institution in which buyers and sellers of a 
good or asset meet”. However, the everyday sense of the word “market” also tends 
to include market participants, market conditions, legal framework, geographical 
area and more. But when we are talking about electricity markets the word “market” 
has a different meaning (Boisseleau, 2004). 
 
“In electricity markets generators, traders, distribution companies are “markets 
participants” while regulators, and laws and legal aspects constitute, the “market’s 
legal framework”. Also, since power exchanges are markets for wholesale electricity, 
the retail market is excluded from our definition of a market. So, the word market 
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will refer to all places or institutions in which buyers and sellers of wholesale 
electricity contracts meet to ratify” (Boisseleau, 2004). 
 
So as generation companies and load supplying companies became market 
participants, they are looking to sell or buy electricity. Also other market players 
appeared, like traders who buy and sell electricity. 
 
It is being attempted the restructuring of electricity market to resemble traditional 
markets of other goods. “However electricity defers from other commodities in a 
number of significant ways: 
 
 The need to instantaneously balance generation and demand, 
 No means to effectively store large amounts of electricity, 
 Transmission being a natural monopoly, 
 Severe limitations in the ability to control the flow of electricity” (Kockar, 
2003). 
 
These factors make electricity markets more complex to run and it is needed a good 
central coordination. The first feature requires real-time balancing between 
generation and demand at every bus. The lack of storage means that prices are more 
volatile and sensitive to market power, which means that some participants are in a 
position to influence the market outcome, and thus benefit at the expense of others. 
 
Another feature that influences electricity markets to be perfect competitive is that 
transmission is a natural monopoly and it is very difficult to control effectively the 
flows of electricity. This special characteristic is not appeared in most traditional 
markets. This is a significant problem in electricity markets, because if the control of 
transmission flows is inadequate then there can be as system failure because of 
unreliable operation (Kockar, 2003). 
 
All these special features of electricity markets will be considered when it will be 
presented later, how a competitive electricity market is structured. 
 
 
4.3 Wholesale competitive electricity market design 
 
 
Wholesale market design is central to the introduction of competition in the 
electricity industry. “A short term electricity market coordinated by a system 
operator provides a foundation for a competitive electricity market. Combined with 
long term contracts for generation and transmission congestion, the spot market and 
competitive market pricing can support open access to the transmission grid” 
(Hogan, 1998). 
 
Coordination through the system operator is unavoidable. Beginning with the 
establishment of a bid-based short run electricity market we create the basis in the 
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wholesale electricity market for competition among the market participants. Next it 
is going to be analyzed how transmission costs change the locational prices of 
electricity. Then long-run market contracts are introduced in order to mitigate or 
share the risk of volatile market prices. And lastly, scheduling and balancing 
operations from the system operator will define the final market price. 
 
4.3.1 Economics of a competitive electricity market 
 
As we said earlier, the first step for restructuring the electricity market emphasizes 
the unbundling of the traditional vertical integrated utilities into separate 
commercial units that operate independently of each other. Generation, 
transmission and distribution will operate independently and the security of the 
system operation will be handled by an independent entity which is called system 
operator (S.O.). A pool-based market coordinated by a system operator is the one 
which help as to re-build the electricity market (Figure 31). 
 
 
Figure 31: Competitive Wholesale Electricity Market Structure (Hogan, 1998) 
 
One of the most significant requirements and simultaneously a constraint is the 
reliability of the system operation. The current electricity networks are complex. 
Electricity flows freely in the transmission grid and the use of the system operator 
which coordinates the transmission has a central role (Hogan, 1998). 
 
The flow of electricity in the system is maintained and controlled by dispatch 
centers. It is the responsibility of the dispatch center to match the supply of 
electricity with the demand. So control of the transmission usage by the system 
operator means control of dispatch. 
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As, we earlier said, the system operator should be independent of the electric 
utilities and the other market participants. So the role of the system operator is to 
control the procedure and not to participate in it and compete in the energy market 
(Hogan, 1998). 
 
Under the competitive market assumption, producers are no longer these who 
determine the market price. Producers are price takers and consumers are those 
who determine the market price they are called price makers. 
 
4.3.2 Short-run market 
 
The basis for building a competitive wholesale electricity market is the short run 
market. The short run is a short time for the human and in most cases is fifteen 
minutes or half an hour. In the short-run we assume that there is no congestion cost 
and transmission of real power flows freely to the grid. All market participants, 
power plants, transmission grid and distribution lines are all in place (Hogan, 1998). 
 
In the short-run market electricity power is a commodity product and the decision 
that should be taken from the system operator is about the delivery of power. The 
operation of the market is about delivering power from generators to consumers. In 
a half hour the market participants compete to each other to move real power from 
producers to consumers. 
 
As we earlier said, in the competitive electricity market consumers are price makers 
and generators are price takers. Consumers decide in what price they are willing to 
buy power and generators are bidding and compete to each other in order to being 
“dispatched” and produce power that is needed. 
 
More precisely, power plants have marginal costs of generating real power and 
consumers have different quantities of demand. The consumers’ demands are 
depending on the price at that half hour. Consumers have demands sensitive to 
prices, that’s why higher prices produce lower demands. 
 
Marginal costs stack up to define the generation short-run marginal-cost curve 
(Figure 32), from least to most expensive, which is about power supply (Hogan, 
1998). 
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Figure 32: Short-run marginal-cost curve (Hogan, 1998) 
 
Generators and customers do not act unilaterally. They provide information to the 
dispatcher. The result of the decision process is what power plants will run at the 
half hour. The system operator’s target is to match supply and demand in the most 
efficient way based on the participants’ bids. So the outcome of system operator’s 
decision is a least-cost dispatch which simultaneously is the competitive-market 
dispatch. 
 
4.3.2.1 Differences between traditional power pool and competitive market 
 
In the traditional power pool the power that the customer buys from a generator is 
based according to an average cost. Typically the cost data come from engineering 
estimates of how is the cost of a power plant at a given time in order to produce 
energy. However based only to these costs it is problematic because the true 
opportunity cost of this operation may be different. Opportunity cost is based on the 
decision of the generator that may find it worthwhile not to produce energy in a 
specific cost – because the generator may include other features in his decision 
which may change the operation cost. For instance, the producer may find it 
worthwhile not to produce electricity in a specific half hour but buy power from the 
pool and sell it. Or the producer may find it worthwhile not to operate at all for the 
specific half hour. 
 
“The alternative of the traditional model is replacing the engineering estimates with 
market bids. Each bid defines the minimum acceptable price that the generator 
would accept to run the power plant at a given half hour” (Hogan, 1998). 
 
Lastly, the operation of bidding by the generators is not a simple procedure. The true 
marginal cost for each generator is the optimal bid. If a generator bids more, then in 
the competitive electricity market there is enough competition that lessens the 
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 03:54:03 EET - 137.108.70.7
53 
 
chance of the generator to being dispatched. That means that if the generator is 
bidding more probably he won’t be selected to run his power plant. On the other 
hand, if the generator bids less then there is a significant risk to run the power plant 
in a cost smaller that the cost of the generation. 
 
The premise for this operation to be successful is that there is no collusion. To 
summarize the procedure, the system operator takes bids from buyers and sellers 
and balance supply and demand at the given half hour. This balancing maximizes the 
benefits for producers and consumers. The market price that finally occurs, it is 
called “market equilibrium price” and every half hour consumers pay producers the 
equilibrium price (Hogan, 1998). 
 
4.3.3 Transmission Congestion  
 
In the short-run market we assumed that power plants, transmission grid and 
distribution lines are all in place and that transmission was nothing more than 
putting power into one part of the grid and taking it out at another. 
 
However, not all power is generated and consumed at the same location. In reality 
generating plants and customers are connected through a free flowing grid of 
transmission and distribution lines. The transmission complicates the short-run 
market through the introduction of losses and possible congestion costs (Hogan, 
1998). 
 
Losses are easy to be handled. A generator may produce power in a location and 
deliver it far away in different locations. That delivering of power creates losses, so 
the marginal cost of delivering power to different locations defers at least by the 
marginal effects on losses by the system. But this additional effect does not 
complicate the short-run market. The equilibrium price that will occur would have 
taken into account the cost of losses and the result will be different prices according 
the location. 
 
On the other hand transmission congestion is more complicated to be handled. The 
transmission grid has constrains, for example thermal constrains or voltage 
constrains. When delivering power from one location to another, the distance 
between these two locations may be long, the grid constrains will impose a higher 
marginal cost in these locations.  
 
In the simplest case power will flow from the low cost to the high cost location. But 
because of the grids limitations in high demand periods not all power that could be 
generated in the low cost location could be delivered in the high cost location. In this 
case the low cost plant will not be used efficiently and more expensive plants would 
cover the high demand for energy. The difference between the marginal cost at the 
high cost location and the marginal cost at the low cost location is called congestion 
rental. For example, if there is a cheap coal plant in a location but due to 
transmission constrains cannot operate at all, and there is in another location an 
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expensive oil plant that costs more than twice to run, then the congestion rental (i.e. 
the difference between the marginal costs) would be greater than the cost of energy 
at the coal plant (Hogan, 1998). 
 
However, the grid is not as simple as in a case with a single line between two 
locations. In the real network there are loops that make it more complicated, but the 
result would be the same. 
 
The extension of the transmission congestion costs in the short-run market has no 
difficulty. The only difference is that now the market has a different price for each 
location. Customers will bid and set the maximum price that they are willing to pay 
in their location. Generators also will bid as before, but the bid now is going to be 
the minimum acceptable price for each location. Generators and customers see a 
single price at their location for the half hour, and the prices vary over the half hours 
to reflect the changes of supply and demand. Now the economic dispatch will 
include different prices for each location that combine generation, losses and 
congestion costs. The system operator coordinates the dispatch and the result will 
be the optimal price which balances supply and demand (Hogan, 1998). 
 
The way that the short-run competitive market, which includes the transmission 
congestion costs, works, can be extended in bilateral transactions. We can assume 
that if market participants want to schedule a transmission between two locations 
this is the same as the difference in price between these two locations as explained 
above. In addition this type of pricing can be extended in day ahead scheduling and 
more. 
 
4.3.4 Long-run market contracts 
 
The spot market price is volatile either there are congestion constrains either there 
are not. With the continuing changing of the supply and demand conditions 
generators and customers will see fluctuations in the short-run prices. These 
fluctuations are a risk both for producers and consumers. In order to mitigate this 
risk the market offers long-term contracts. 
 
As it was presented in the previous chapter in the traditional types of commodity 
markets there is a type of contract that is called “contract of difference”. When the 
price of a commodity is controlled by a centralized market contracts for difference 
can be used whereby the parties will agree on the amount of the commodity and 
also a price which is called strike price (Kirschen and Strbac, 2004). 
 
The basic assumption in the traditional market is that if a specific producer wants to 
satisfy the demand of a specific consumer, they make an agreement. But when the 
customer’s needs change then the customer might sell the contract of this 
agreement in the secondary market. The same applies to the producer. 
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The short-term pool based electricity market coordinated by a system operator is a 
centralized market. Generators provide power into the grid and consumers are 
taking power out of the grid. To achieve an efficient economic dispatch the 
dispatcher must have the freedom, in responding to the bids, to decide which plants 
run to generate the energy needed, independent of the long-term contracts. So, 
“short-term dispatch decisions by the system operator are made independent and 
without recognition of the long-term contracts” (Hogan, 1998). In this way electricity 
defers from other commodities. 
 
Because of the very complicated grid interactions there is no possibility to identify 
which generator is serving which customer. The transmission constrains and the fact 
that there is no possibility to control flows, it changes the character of the long-term 
contracts. The contracts will provide a hedge, because of the volatility of the price, 
not by controlling the flow of power and which generator serves a specific customer, 
but with managing the flow of money. So in the competitive electricity markets the 
long-term contracts defer from the traditional markets because there is no need for 
any specific plant to deliver the commodity (i.e. real power) to any specific customer 
(Hogan, 1998). 
 
4.3.4.1 First case: No transmission congestion and long-term contracts 
 
In the first case we assume that there are no transmission congestion costs. So, 
there are no different prices in different locations and we can treat it like generation 
and consumption happen in the same location.  
 
The contract for differences here has the role to mitigate the deviations from the 
equilibrium market price. We can assume that a producer and a consumer agree in a 
specific quantity for a specific price, for instance 100 MW for 5 cents. “On the half 
hour, if the pool price is 6 cents, the customer buys power from the pool at 6 cents 
and the generator sells power for 6 cents. Under the contract, the generator owes 
the customer 1 cent for each of the 100 MW over the half hour. In the reverse case, 
with the pool price at 3 cents, the customer pays 3 cents to the system operator, 
which in turn pays 3 cents to the generator, but now the customer owes the 
generator 2 cents for each of the 100 MW over the half hour” (Hogan, 1998). 
 
But in this case of the short-term pool based electricity market there is a significant 
advantage comparing with the traditional spot market. In the traditional spot 
market, as we earlier said, the parties of the agreement may find it worthwhile to 
sell their contracts in the secondary market. In the competitive electricity market 
there is already a secondary market, because of the special structure of the market, 
which is the pool. So if the customer’s demand is above or below the agreed price of 
the contract, the extra power can be purchased or be sold at the pool price. Similarly 
for the generator, there is already a secondary market, the pool, for surplus or 
backup supplies. And if the customer consumes the agreed quantity and the 
producer generates the agreed quantity - as it has been agreed to the contract – 
then the market guarantees that the consumer will buy the agreed quantity from the 
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producer at the agreed price, independently from the pool price at that half hour. So 
the long-run market contracts do not disturb the short-run market incentives and 
hence they can be used compatible with the short-run market (Hogan, 1998). 
 
Finally, the system operator should not know the terms and conditions of the 
contracts between producers and consumers in order not to favor someone against 
another.  
 
4.3.4.2 Second case: Transmission congestion and long term contracts 
 
When transmission congestion is taking into account there are two problems that 
occur and that they should be handled. The first problem is different prices for each 
location because of the transmission constrains and monopoly of the system 
operator that can manipulate the dispatch and the grid expansion. When 
transmission congestions costs are added to the system, the revenues that are 
collected from customers exceed the payments to generators. This congestion rent 
itself will be high volatile with the same way as the short-run market prices. When 
the congestion rent is collected this payment goes to the system operator. So if the 
system operator keeps the congestion revenue, then there are incentives for the 
system operator to manipulate the dispatch and not let the grid expansion in order 
to have even greater congestion rentals. This is happening because as we earlier said 
the system operator is a natural monopoly (Hogan, 1998). 
 
For the first problem the solution is a price hedge against the volatile locational 
congestion differentials. For the second problem the solution is removing for the 
system operator the possibility to keep the congestion rentals. 
 
As it was described for the long-run market contracts for generation, in the same 
way it should be introduced long-run transmission congestion contracts, in order to 
mitigate the risk of fluctuations in the congestion rentals. Both types of contracts will 
operate simultaneously. As in the generation contracts, it is not possible for the 
system operator to know which generator delivers power to which customer. 
However, as in the generation contracts before, transmission congestion contracts 
would provide a compensation for differences in the congestion costs between 
different locations in the grid (Hogan, 1998). 
 
In Figure 33, we can see an example of transmission congestion contracts which 
contain differences in locational prices due to transmission congestion costs and 
losses. 
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Figure 33: Network transmission congestion contracts (Hogan, 1998) 
 
We can see in Figure 33, transmission between C and B would pay 2.25 cents. In this 
transmission charge the congestion cost is 1.95 cents and losses are 0.30 cents. The 
result of a transmission congestion contract between C and B would be a payment of 
1.95 cents to the holder of the contract by the system operator. Hence, “if the 
participant actually transported the power, the transmission congestion contract 
would just balance the congestion charge for the quantity covered by the contract. 
And if the holder of the transmission congestion contract does not transport power, 
the result is the same as selling the transmission right to the actual user” (Hogan, 
1998). 
 
So the right provide by the contract would not be for specific movement of power 
but rather for payment of the congestion rental. 
 
4.3.4.3 Transmission congestion contract auction and constrains with out of merit 
cost 
 
In Figure 34 illustrates a hypothetical auction for transmission congestion contracts 
with two demand curves. As a network we get the simplest case, which is a network 
with three deferent locations. 
 
 
Figure 34: Auction of transmission congestion contracts (Hogan, 1998) 
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We can see in Figure 34 that the optimal price and quantity based on bids that 
maximizes the benefit for the contracts is 480 MW power at price 3.6 cents from bus 
1 to bus 3 and 840 MW of power at price 1.8 from bus 2 to bus 3. These transmission 
congestion contracts will provide a price protection because of the volatility of the 
congestion costs. 
 
In Figure 35 we can see the real power that will be produced and the prices in each 
of the three locations in a hypothetical short-run market. 
 
 
Figure 35: Constrains with out of merit costs (Hogan, 1998) 
 
We can see that the total load on bus 3 is 3000 MW. The generation takes place at 
bus 3 is 2100 MW and the other 900 MW, in order to balance the supply and 
demand, come from bus 1. The market clearing prices are 2 cents at bus 1, 2.3 cents 
at bus 2 and 2.6 cents at bus 3.  
 
We can see that the market equilibrium for this dispatch is different with the flows 
envisioned in the transmission congestions contracts in Figure 34, because as we 
earlier said the right provide by the contract is not for specific movement of power 
but for payment of the congestion rental. 
 
“As long as the allocation of the transmission congestion contracts defines a set of 
inputs and outputs that would be simultaneously feasible, then the revenue 
collected from the spot prices for congestion will be sufficient to compensate the 
holders of the contracts for the obligations at the same set of spot prices” (Hogan, 
1998). 
 
Finally in Table 3 we can see the system operator revenues. 
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Table 3: System operator revenues (Hogan, 1998) 
 
 
System operator collects the transmission congestion rents from the users of the 
system and distributes them to the holders of the contracts. In the example 
presented the payments exactly balance. In a more complicated network there 
probably will be an excess of congestion rents. This excess should not remain in the 
system operator but it will be shared according to a formula to those who paying the 
grid costs. 
 
To sum up, “the system operator collects and pays according to the short-run 
marginal price at each location and it distributes the congestion rentals to the 
holders of the transmission congestion contracts”. (Hogan, 1998) 
 
4.3.5 Scheduling and balancing 
 
The most attractive method in order to result the coordinated by the system 
operator short-run dispatch is day-ahead bidding. This does not require real-time 
dispatch capabilities and it is preferred because it provides a greater opportunity for 
participation by flexible demand. 
 
In the day ahead bidding the system operator accepts bids for a scheduled dispatch a 
day ahead and determines the equilibrium price and any associated payment 
settlements (for example payments for transmission congestion contracts). (Hogan, 
1998) 
 
“This schedule then defines a set of commitments for delivering and taking power in 
the short-run dispatch. In the day-ahead event, the actual dispatch will differ from 
the scheduled commitments, and appropriate balancing settlements would be 
arranged” (Hogan, 1998). In Figure 36 it is presented a balancing price for deviations 
from scheduled commitments. 
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Figure 36: Balancing price for deviations from scheduled commitments (Hogan, 1998) 
 
The way that day-ahead scheduling bidding works is that participants are bidding for 
supply and demand a day ahead. The system operator takes into account the day-
ahead bidding and result a least-cost dispatch that matches scheduled demand and 
supply in the most optimal way, both for the producers and consumers. 
 
The equilibrium price and the quantity that occur, define the day-ahead schedule. 
The system operator also defines reliability commitments in order to meet any 
expected deviations in the load from the day-ahead schedule. These commitments 
may include spinning and standby reserves (Hogan, 1998). 
 
The schedule and the associated dispatch commitments would provide the reference 
point for the actual dispatch. Bids in the scheduling market could be revised to 
create balancing bids for increments and decrements against the dispatch 
commitments. Again the system operator would find the least-cost dispatch, hour by 
hour, based on the actual conditions and the final balancing bids. The result would 
be an actual dispatch with associated equilibrium prices and quantities. These prices 
and quantities would differ to a degree from the schedules (Hogan, 1998). 
 
 
 
4.4 Case studies: The PJM and the Nordic Electricity Market approach 
 
4.4.1 The PJM electricity market 
 
“The PJM (Pennsylvania - New Jersey - Maryland) market is the largest centrally 
dispatched control area in North America and is often cited as one of the leading 
example of a successful competitive electricity market” (Boisseleau, 2004). 
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PJM provides an interesting example of market design where organized markets and 
transmission pricing are integrated and are at the heart of the functioning of the 
electricity market. PJM reaches into eight states and the District of Columbia in 
North America. It serves about 11 millions customers (Boisseleau, 2004). 
 
PJM combines the power exchange and the system operator. It started operation of 
its spot market in 1997. At that time the spot market provided a single price for the 
entire PJM region. In situation of congestion, some generators were constrained on, 
while others were constrained off, which means that low cost plants will not be used 
efficiently and more expensive plants would cover the high demand for energy. The 
main drawback of this method was that generators constrained off were paid 
nothing, even though they had bids below the system price. The high cost that 
appeared by using more expensive generation was socialized into a charge applied to 
all loads (Boisseleau, 2004). 
 
The single price was problematic as it was unable to reflect adequately locational 
value of energy throughout the market related to transmission constraints. For this 
reason PJM switched from a single price system to a locational marginal pricing. 
Since 1998, PJM has determined hourly locational marginal prices on a nodal basis 
which reflects the underlying cost of the energy and the marginal cost of 
transmission congestion. 
 
In addition, PJM collects bilateral schedules and bids from market participants. Based 
on these schedules and bids, PJM determines an optimal dispatch for power flows 
and the associated locational marginal prices. 
 
In order to allow financial hedging against price differences between locations, the 
locational marginal prices system as explained before in the wholesale analysis is 
accompanied by a system of transmission rights. These transmission congestion 
contracts compensate the holders of the contracts because of the congestion 
charges that arise from locational differences, as analyzed before. 
 
The example of PJM is really interesting because it first worked with single zonal 
pricing and collapsed due to transmission constraints. Then PJM adopted a nodal 
pricing system, which appeared to be the most efficient approach, providing 
successful outcomes. PJM’s successful experience with nodal pricing system shows 
the practical feasibility of such a system (Boisseleau, 2004). 
 
4.4.2 The Nordic Electricity Market – A successful retail competitive market 
approach 
 
The Nordic electricity market design is a very successful example of a competitive 
retail electricity market. It consists of five Nordic countries Norway, Sweden, Finland 
and Denmark. They present a very interesting example of how a power exchange is 
used for dealing with congestion. The wholesale market restructure as presented by 
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Hogan is the difficult part of restructuring the electricity market, and it provides the 
basis for building a competitive retail services upon it. 
 
The Nordic electricity market is divided into regulated monopoly operations, 
transmission and distribution, and to competitive operations, generation and supply. 
On the regulated side, high voltage electricity transmission from production plants to 
distribution networks is controlled by transmission system operators (TSO). In the 
Nordic countries, each country has one legally separated transmission system 
operator. Low voltage distribution to end consumers is controlled by distribution 
system operators (DSO). There are large amount of DSOs in each Nordic country and 
most of them are small, municipally owned utilities (Tuovinen, 2009). 
 
Competitive part of the electricity market is formed by two types of markets, the 
Nordic wholesale market and the national retail markets. On a Nordic wholesale 
market, electricity is produced in production plants under competition. The 
wholesale price is formed by the equilibrium of demand and supply in the Nordic 
power exchange (Nord Pool). Nord Pool consists of two markets, the physical 
market, Nord Pool Spot AS (which consists of day-ahead market Elspot and intra-day 
market Elbas), and financial market, Nord Pool ASA. Retailers buy their power from 
Nord Pool. They use bilateral contracts or produce their electricity themselves and 
sell it to the end consumers (Tuovinen, 2009). The structure of the Nordic electricity 
market, before and after the restructuring, is presented in Figure 37. 
 
 
Figure 37: Nordic electricity market before and after the restructuring (Tuovinen, 
2009) 
 
In 2012, 77% of all the electricity consumed was bought on day-ahead market Elspot 
(Nord pool spot, 2013). Figure 38 below illustrates daily routines of Elspot trading. 
 
In the day-ahead Elspot market takes place auction of power for delivery the 
following day. Prices are calculated based on supply, demand and transmission 
capacity (Nord pool spot, 2013). 
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Figure 38: Elspot trading daily routines (Nord pool spot, 2013) 
 
As for the intra-day market Elbas, it is a continuous market where power trading 
takes place until one hour before the power is delivered. Members can adjust their 
power production or consumption plans close to delivery. Every day, transmission 
system operators publish their power transmission capacity to Elbas. Members offer 
how much power they want to sell and buy and at what price. Trading is then set 
based on a first-come, first-served basis between a seller and a buyer. If transmission 
capacity is available, neighboring countries can trade on the Elbas market (Nord pool 
spot, 2013). 
 
The retail market consists of retailers and retail customers. Regulators create the 
rules and framework for the market. Electricity retailing is primarily financial 
operations as the actual delivery of electricity to consumers is taken care by DSOs.  
 
Retailers act as an intermediate between the wholesale market and end consumers. 
Retailers may have own production or distribution or they can be totally 
independent. Deregulated market has created new challenges for the retailers.  
 
Electricity retailing has in general small margins and high risks. Retail competition 
can be defined as the ability of a customer to choose a preferred retail supplier. 
Consumers can choose from which retailer to buy their electricity according to their 
preferences. Most commonly the motivator to switch is the price and possible 
savings. Price of electricity is composed of three parts, the price of electric energy, 
taxes and the network tariff, from which only the price of electric energy is under 
competition. In addition to price competition, competition in electricity retailing is 
generally expected, for example, to improve customer services, create innovations, 
bring choice of commercial offers to customers and improve security of supply by 
transmitting high wholesale prices to end-users in scarcity periods (Tuovinen, 2009). 
 
Nord pool is also a unique example of zonal deviation. Nord pool covers five areas, 
Norway, Sweden, Finland, East Denmark and West Denmark and potentially up to 
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eight congestion zones since Norway may be divided into four zones as illustrated in 
Figure 39. 
 
“In general, due to a weak level of interconnection between countries with respect 
to national grid density, the first determinants of congestion zones are national 
borders. Secondly within Norway different zones are defined due to internal 
bottlenecks” (Boisseleau, 2004). 
 
Figure 39: Zonal approach for Nord pool (Boisseleau, 2004) 
 
As we explained transmission congestion creates different price at each location. The 
use of locational prices has been described as being too complex, with the 
implication that an alternative approach would produce a simpler system. A 
common response to this assertion has been to recommend a "zonal" approach that 
would aggregate many locations into a smaller number of zones. The assumption has 
been that this would tend to reduce complexity. However, Hogan (1998) disagrees 
with this approach and provides a number of examples in his analysis which show 
that the simplest model is the nodal one, with different prices in each location. 
 
Although the Nordic pool model is described as a zonal approach, the system 
operator has the possibility to change the definition of zones daily or hourly with 
respect to transmission constraints. This system can be better described as a nodal 
pricing system (Boisseleau, 2004). 
 
Indeed, “Nord pool is continuously investigating new ways of dividing up the joint 
Nordic electricity market according to structural bottlenecks in the grid and 
independently of national borders to reflect actual physical constraints in the grid 
and thus provide market players with better signals as to where surplus and shortfall 
areas are located” (Boisseleau, 2004). 
 
Nord pool system is generally considered to be successful. “One of the key elements 
of its success is the development of a common cross-border mechanism managed by 
a common institution formed by the system operators that directly run the power 
exchange” (Boisseleau, 2004). 
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5. Conclusions 
 
The pool-based, short-term, competitive electricity market radically changes the 
traditional way markets work. Consumers play a significant role in the electricity 
market restructuring. Their contribution in the price determination is very important. 
Consumers are no more price-takers. Now they are price-makers and generators 
play the role of price-takers. Generators compete to each other in order to satisfy 
the producers’ demand. The system operator takes the bids from generators and 
consumers and provides the equilibrium price, in order to balance supply and 
demand, every half hour in the spot market. In addition to that, long term market 
contracts provide hedging to mitigate the risks of price fluctuations and volatile 
congestion rentals. Finally, scheduling and balancing methods occur in order to deal 
with what is called day-ahead bidding. The objective of the pool-based, short-term, 
competitive electricity market is to optimize the benefits both for producers and 
consumers. 
Of course, the continuous growing in demand for electricity and many other 
challenges of the grid, like reliability and efficiency, are significant drivers of the 
competitive electricity market. Supply of electricity must always equal demand, 
because electricity is vital in our cotemporary way of living. Also costs of blackouts 
and failures in the grid have really huge impacts in our societies. In the competitive 
electricity market higher prices produce lower demands for the consumers, in order 
to meet the supply in high peak demand periods. 
However nothing of these would be possible without the technology development 
and the smart grids. Many state of the art technologies like monitoring and control, 
demand response systems, transmission enhancement applications, advanced 
metering infrastructure and of course information and communication technologies, 
provide the grid with all these tools needed it, in order to meet the growing 
challenges. 
Greater interconnectedness, renewable energy and price-directed demand drive the 
evolution of the conventional power grids towards intelligent power networks. 
 
Lastly, the smart grid helps us not only to reduce the costs and make a more reliably 
energy system, but also smart grid helps us meet the huge environmental challenges 
that this world face. Smart grid is a step forward to a more sustainable and 
“greener” planet. 
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APPENDIX 
 
International Energy Agency - Energy Technology Perspectives 2010 
 
The ETP BLUE Map Scenario aims to ensure that global energy-related CO2 emissions 
are reduced to half their current levels by 2050. This scenario examines ways in 
which the introduction of existing and new low-carbon technologies might achieve 
this at least cost, while also bringing energy security benefits in terms of reduced 
dependence on oil and gas, and health benefits as air pollutant emissions are 
reduced. The BLUE Map Scenario is consistent with a long-term global rise in 
temperatures of 2oC to 3oC, but only if the reduction in energy-related CO2 
emissions is combined with deep cuts in other greenhouse-gas emissions. The 
Baseline Scenario considers the business-as-usual case, not reducing emission levels 
to any predetermined goal by 2050. The BLUE Map and Baseline Scenarios are based 
on the same macroeconomic assumptions. 
 
We can see more specific what these scenarios mean for the electricity supply and 
demand. 
 
Electricity Demand in the Baseline and the Blue Map Scenario 
 
Electricity demand in the Baseline scenario increases on average by 2.0% a year 
between 2007 and 2050, making electricity the fastest-growing component of total 
final demand (Figure A1). Electricity demand increases from 16 999 terawatt-hours 
(TWh) in 2007 to 42 655 TWh in 2050. Electricity’s share of final demand increases 
from 17% in 2007 to 23% in 2050. These trends are driven by rapid growth in 
population and incomes in developing countries, by the continuing increase in the 
number of electricity-consuming devices used in homes and commercial buildings, 
and by the growth in electrically driven industrial processes (IEA, 2010). 
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Figure A1: World electricity demand by scenario (IEA, 2010) 
 
Significant efficiency improvements reduce electricity demand in the BLUE Map 
scenario as compared with the Baseline scenario. 
 
Baseline electricity demand in non-OECD countries grows on average by 3.1% a year, 
almost three times as fast as in OECD countries. This is primarily due to higher 
population growth and rapid increases in GDP and per-capita incomes in developing 
countries. Between now and 2050, tens of millions of people in developing countries 
will gain access to electricity. 
 
In the BLUE Map scenario, global electricity demand growth is reduced to an average 
of 1.8% a year, with demand reaching 36 948 TWh in 2050. Electricity demand in 
2050 is 13% below the Baseline scenario level. Electricity savings occur mostly in the 
buildings sector and in industry in the BLUE Map scenario, but these are partially 
offset by increased electricity demand in the transport sector as a result of the 
uptake of PHEVs (plug-in hybrid electric vehicles) and EVs (electric vehicles) (IEA, 
2010). 
 
Electricity Production in the Baseline and the Blue Map Scenario 
 
In the Baseline scenario, global electricity production increases by 134% between 
2007 and 2050 (Figure A2). Fossil fuels maintain their high share in the electricity 
generation mix, accounting for two-thirds of the total. In 2050, coal-based 
generation is 149% higher than in 2007, accounting for 44% of all power generation. 
The share of gas-fired power generation increases slightly to 23%, while oil is almost 
completely phased out. Nuclear decreases to 10%, hydro decreases to 12%, and 
wind increases to account for 5% of all power generation. As a result of the 
continued dependence on fossil fuels, CO2 emissions from electricity generation will 
almost double between 2007 and 2050 (IEA, 2010). 
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Figure A2: Global electricity production by energy source and by scenario (IEA, 2010) 
 
There is a major shift from fossil fuels to low-carbon alternatives in the BLUE Map 
scenario. 
 
As we said earlier, electricity demand in 2050 in the BLUE Map scenario is 13% lower 
than in the Baseline scenario owing to increased energy efficiency in the end-use 
sectors. This is despite the fact that some of the increased efficiency in industry and 
buildings is offset by higher demand for electricity for additional uses, such as heat 
pumps and plug-in hybrid vehicles (PHEVs) and electric vehicles (EVs). 
 
As well as reducing electricity demand, the CO2 emissions reduction incentives and 
other measures introduced in the BLUE Map scenario radically change the electricity 
generation mix relative to the Baseline scenario. Low-carbon energy sources, such as 
nuclear and renewables, become more attractive compared to fossil-fuelled power. 
By 2050, a variety of renewables generate almost half the electricity in the BLUE 
Map scenario and nuclear increases its share to 24%. Coal-fired generation reduces 
to 12% by 2050, more than 90% of which is combined with CCS. Gas-fired generation 
is also much lower than in the Baseline scenario with a 15% share, of which almost 
one-third is fitted with CCS (IEA, 2010). 
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